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ABSTRACT   
The past several years have seen an evolution in the obligations of pharmaceutical companies 
conducting clinical trials abroad.  Key players, such as international human rights organizations, the 
United States government and courts, and the media have played a significant role in defining those 
obligations.  This article examines the evolution of those obligations through the lens of past, present, and 
future recommendations for informed consent protections.  In doing so, this article suggests that, no matter 
how robust these obligations become on their face, they will continue to fall short of providing meaningful 
protection until they are accompanied by a substantive enforcement mechanism that holds multinational 
pharmaceutical companies accountable for their conduct. Issues of national sovereignty, particularly in the 
United States, will continue to prevent meaningful enforcement from an international tribunal or from one 
universally adopted code of ethics.  Rather than continuing to pursue an untenable international approach, 
this article argues that a viable enforcement mechanism lies in application of the Alien Torts Statute (ATS).  
Recent federal appellate court precedent interpreting the ATS provides the mechanism for granting victim 
redress and enforcing sponsor accountability for informed consent misconduct.   A vital component in 
ensuring the world population’s “right to health” includes substantive human rights protections.  This 
article concludes that by building on the federal appellate court’s ATS analysis, which grants foreign trial 
participants the right to pursue claims of human rights violations in the United States, a mechanism for 




Over the last several years, the conduct of pharmaceutical companies sponsoring clinical trials 
abroad has come under increased scrutiny.  This examination is due in part to concerns that 
companies are conducting clinical research overseas to avoid regulations and human rights 
protections that control domestic research.  Fuelling these concerns are civil lawsuits, criminal 
indictments, international investigations and news exposés that have brought attention to 
human rights abuses resulting from multinational pharmaceutical companies’ ability to 
capitalize on the less stringent regulatory requirements in several developing countries1.  The 
World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations (UN), and several higher-income 
countries are focusing on these regulatory disparities with the goal of better protecting the 
health and human rights of trial participants.  While these efforts address several aspects of 
global clinical trials, no issue is more fundamental to a discussion on human rights protections 
owed to individuals in medical experiments than informed consent.  In general terms, 
obtaining informed consent requires researchers to convey adequately to subjects the risks and 
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benefits of the trial, their rights as participants, and their choice whether to participate in the 
trial.  Informed consent ensures protection of the human subject’s “right to bodily integrity” -- 
to “exercise sovereignty over her body”.2  When discussing human rights protections, the 
international framework -- codes, declarations, covenants, guidelines, and laws -- that 
articulates the informed consent obligations of nation-states and researchers in clinical trials is 
well defined.   In contrast, the structures that articulate the obligations of sponsors’ (i.e., 
pharmaceutical companies) are still developing.3
 
   
Part I of this article explores pharmaceutical companies’ evolving informed consent 
obligations.  First, this section examines an event that brought the globalization of clinical 
trials and the issue of informed consent into the public eye -- Pfizer’s controversial drug trial 
in Nigeria.  Second, this section provides the legal and ethical background behind the 
international and United States approach to pharmaceutical companies’ informed consent 
obligations.  Part II identifies methods by which current pharmaceutical company obligations 
can evolve to promote the “full realization of the right to health” as articulated in Article 2 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Finally, Part III 
concludes with a discussion of how to enforce these obligations.  The first part of this section 
challenges the suggestion that effective enforcement could come from an international 
tribunal or universal acceptance of one international code. Next, this section provides an 
analysis of the Second Circuit’s disposition of the case brought by the families and victims 
injured because of Pfizer’s conduct in Nigeria.  Finally, this section concludes that the Second 
Circuit’s analysis in that case, along with other precedent can be expanded to provide a 
solution to the vexing problem of enforcement of human rights protections against 
multinational corporations.4
PART I – PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES EVOLVING INFORMED CONSENT 
OBLIGATIONS  
 
Pfizer’s Trovan Clinical Trial 
In early 1996, an epidemic of bacterial meningitis broke out in the state of Kano, Nigeria.  
Bacterial meningitis is an infection of the fluids surrounding the spinal cord and brain.  If not 
properly treated, it can result in hearing loss, brain damage or death. However, with early 
diagnosis and treatment, the risk of death is less than 15%.5  Doctors Without Borders, a non-
profit humanitarian organization, arrived in Kano shortly after the initial outbreak to provide 
humanitarian and medical aid.  The organization began to treat the victims of the outbreak 
with the intravenous (IV) form of chloramphenicol, the WHO-endorsed generic antibiotic for 
bacterial meningitis in low-income countries.6
Within six weeks of hearing about the epidemic, Pfizer drew up a plan to test an oral form of 
an antibiotic, Trovan,
  
7 on the children in the Kano clinic.  If the oral form of Trovan could be 
shown to work on children as well as the IV antibiotics, it would be a tremendous 
"breakthrough in battling epidemics" worldwide.  "Children could simply swallow a pill" 
rather than receive injections that increase the risk of blood-borne diseases, such as HIV and 
hepatitis.8   Further, a pill would remove the need for skilled healthcare workers to assist in 
administration of the treatment.  Wall Street analysts predicted that, if the Food & Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approved the oral form, it would be a $1 billion blockbuster drug.9
On April 3, 1996, Pfizer’s team of physicians arrived in Nigeria to conduct clinical trials on 
children infected with meningitis.  Nigerian officials authorized Pfizer to take over two of 
Infectious Disease Hospital’s wards to conduct the testing.  Pfizer selected two hundred sick 
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children from lines of those awaiting treatment.  Pfizer divided the children into two groups 
and treated half with Trovan.  The other half was "purposefully 'low-dosed"' with ceftriaxone, 
an FDA-approved drug.10  According to Pfizer protocol, the children were supposed to have 
their blood tested on arrival and again after five days.  If a child was not responding well to 
Trovan, protocol required switching the child’s medication to ceftriaxone.  Nevertheless, 
according to an internal Pfizer document, that plan was generally abandoned "due to the 
shortage of medical staff". 11   As a result, Pfizer did not analyse the children’s blood samples 
and therefore could not determine if a child had a negative reaction until the manifestation of 
a visible and permanent injury.12
Pfizer protocol required injection of ceftriaxone into the subject’s vein or muscle. Due to the 
shortage of skilled workers, however, the drug was usually injected into the child’s buttocks 
or thighs to save time and trouble.  The shots were severely painful, leading to "great fear and 
sometimes dangerous struggles with children," according to trial participants. 
  
13 To lessen the 
pain after initial injections, the report indicated that researchers reduced the amount of 
antibiotic given to children who were improving to one-third of the recommended amount.14  
Pfizer maintained the reduced dose was more than sufficient. The drug's manufacturer, 
Hoffmann-La Roche, however, reported that the reductions could have sapped the drug's 
strength and skewed any comparison to Trovan. 15 There is also evidence that Pfizer failed to 
switch children who were not showing any signs of improvement with Trovan onto standard 
therapy.  This breach in standard protocol allegedly led to severe brain damage or death in 
several children.16
Pfizer’s protocol and international human subject protections contained in the Nuremberg 
Code, Helsinki Declaration, guidelines authored by the Council for International Organization 
of Medical Services (CIOMS) and Article 7 of the International Convent on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) all require informed consent from either the children or their 
guardians.
  
17   However, Pfizer could not produce any evidence that its staff informed the 
children’s parents that the proposed treatment was experimental, that they could refuse it, that 
serious risks were involved, or that other organizations offered more conventional treatments 
at the same site for free.18   In addition, Pfizer failed to follow its protocol that required staff 
to offer or read participants documents, in either English or Hausa, to facilitate their informed 
consent.   When interviewed later, many of the patients and their parents claimed that they did 
not know that they were participating in an experimental drug trial. Pfizer described the lapse 
as a procedural error but stressed in a written statement that "verbal consent was obtained". 19
After spending two weeks in the Kano camp conducting tests, Pfizer left without 
administering any post-trial care.  Five children who received Trovan and six children whom 
Pfizer administered a low dose of Ceftriaxone died.  Others suffered blindness, deafness, and 
paralysis.
 
20 While U.S. medical guidelines recommend that meningitis experiments include 
long-term follow-ups, Pfizer's clinical trial protocol made no mention of the need for long-
term monitoring.21
In 2001, the families of the dead and injured children filed suit against Pfizer under the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) for violating a norm of “customary international law prohibiting medical 
experimentation on non-consenting human subjects.
   
22  Specifically, Pfizer was sued for 
violating the principle of informed consent, refusing to provide the best treatment available 
when it supplied low doses of the controlled drug approved by the FDA and when it failed to 
monitor the progress of the children in the study, and for its decision to conduct a trial using 
medication that were known to cause liver damage in children.23  What the families soon 
learned however, and arguably what Pfizer had known all along, is that neither international 
nor United States law provided redress against American companies for human rights 
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violations conducted across the globe.  What follows is a discussion of how this fact is 
changing. 
 
The Origins of Informed Consent – A Legal Overview  
 
Concerns within the medical community over the treatment of human subjects date back 
centuries.  Only recently however, have these rigorously debated ethical notions and legal 
protections for human subjects been codified.   The six most influential guidelines are the 
Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki Declaration, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS) Guidelines, the International Council for Harmonization Good Clinical 
Practices (ICH/GCP), and the recently revised Food & Drug Administration’s (FDA) Good 
Clinical Practices guidelines for foreign clinical trials (GCP).  While the contours of these 
guidelines vary somewhat, the primacy of informed consent is a constant in every scheme.  
Furthermore, these documents reveal several universally accepted components of informed 
consent – including an explanation of the nature and procedure of the trial in a language that 
participants can understand and a requirement that the researchers obtain informed consent 
without pressuring subjects such that they are free to choose whether to participate.24
 
  
Notwithstanding the clarity and general acceptance of requirements, a gap between the 
theoretical ideal of informed consent and the reality of its application in international clinical 
trials still exists.  
Nuremberg Code 
 
The Nuremberg Code (“Code”) is the original effort by the international community to create 
guidelines governing research on humans.  The goal of the Code is to protect the rights of 
subjects and to prevent the “horrendous non-therapeutic, non-consensual” medical 
experiments conducted by Nazi researchers during World War II from re-occurring.25 The 
Code requires that in medical experiments involving human subjects, “voluntary consent of 
the human subject is essential”.  The individual must be able to “exercise the free power of 
choice” and must have sufficient knowledge of the nature of the experiment to make an 
“enlightened decision.”26  The subject should be informed of the “nature, duration, and 
purpose  . . . the methods and means, all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be 
expected  . . . and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from this 
participation in the experiment.”27
The Code’s significance as the document that symbolizes the beginning of the systematic 
ethical treatment of human subjects in clinical trials is without question.  Taken as a whole, 
however, the Code is a simple document that is ill-equipped to regulate the changing 
landscape of clinical trials.  Chief among the Code’s limitations is that the obligation to 
follow its precepts falls only on the researcher.  The Code does not address sponsor conduct.  
Further, it does not contain criteria to evaluate the quality of consent or provide specific 
measures of enforcement to assure adherence to its requirements.
  
28   In addition, neither the 
United Nations nor the United States recognizes this document as binding law. In fact, in the 
United States, no court has ever awarded an injured individual damages solely for violation of 
the Nuremberg Code.29
 
   
In the context of the Trovan clinical trial, an argument could be made, as the plaintiffs’ did, 
that Pfizer’s conduct violated the Nuremberg Code to the extent that its doctors did not 
procure informed consent from the participants.  The question left unanswered was whether 
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the United States would recognize that violations on international law contained in a 





In 1964, the medical community set forth its version of informed consent standards with the 
World Medical Association’s (WMA) promulgation of the Helsinki Declaration 
(“Declaration”).  Most recently revised in 2008, the Declaration strengthened the foundation 
of the Nuremberg Code by requiring that consent should “preferably” be in writing.30  The 
Declaration also provides that “every patient – including those in the control group if any — 
should be assured of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method.”31  Critics have 
argued, however, that drafters of the Declaration weakened the informed consent obligations 
by making them secondary to other concerns such as the principle “that the individual human 
subject’s health is valued over competing gains to others, and . . . that the best treatment 
available is used.”32  In addition, the Declaration weakened the Code’s universal free and 
fully informed consent requirements.  According to the Declaration, these requirements are 
not needed in therapeutic research if the researcher believes that they are unnecessary or 
difficult to obtain.  Further, the Declaration relaxes informed consent protections in cases of 
legal incompetence, requiring only that consent conform to national as opposed to 
international standards.33  Moreover, physicians and researchers wrote this document 
primarily for themselves.  As such, it places no requirements nor offers any guidance on the 
role of sponsors in clinical trials, much less their corresponding obligations to ensure 
informed consent protections.  Yet, until 2008, this standard governed all clinical trials 





In 1966, the concept of informed consent gained international acceptance when the United 
Nations incorporated this human right into the ICCPR.  Article 7 of the Covenant states that 
“no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation.”35  This obligation is legally binding on the more than 160 state-parties.  By 
its terms, this prohibition is not limited to state actors; rather, it guarantees individuals the 
right to be free from non-consensual medical experimentation by any entity -- state actors, 
private actors, or state and private actors behaving in concert.36  Accordingly, under the 
ICCPR sponsors are liable for failure to obtain informed consent.  While the ICCPR confers 
absolute rights, it is not self-enforcing and has yet to be applied in any human rights lawsuit 
against a non-state actor.37  Moreover, the United States, while recognizing the ICCPR’s 
status, has refused to ratify the document.  Accordingly, the Article 7 of ICCPR, though 




CIOMS Guidelines  
 
In 1982, the WHO and CIOMS created the International Ethical Guidelines for Research 
Involving Human Subjects (“Guidelines”).39  Most recently amended in 2002, the goal of the 
Guidelines is to support and help implement the ethical principles of the Helsinki Declaration 
"particularly in developing countries, given their socio-economic circumstances, laws and 
regulations, and executive and administrative arrangements."40  The Guidelines identify 
twenty-six separate items of information an investigator must provide to trial participants 
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prior to obtaining their informed consent.  For example, the Guidelines require that the 
investigator inform subjects of the risks, benefits, aims, methods, alternative procedures or 
treatments available, and of his or her right to withdraw from the trial without any negative 
consequence.41   The Guidelines also obligate investigators to inform participants of their 
right to free treatment for injuries related to research and the right to compensation for 
accidental injury resulting from the trial.  Unlike the vague notion of informed consent 
articulated in the Declaration, the Guidelines recognize the challenges presented by 
conducting trials in undeveloped countries and require that physicians make “every effort” to 
ensure the individual consent is informed. 42
 
 
The researcher obligations contained in the Guidelines regarding clinical trials in general and 
informed consent, in particular, are exacting.  In sharp contrast, there are no sponsor-specific 
informed consent obligations.  There are, however, five shared sponsor/investigator consent 
responsibilities, including obligations to ensure that intimidation was not used, that consent is 
renewed if there is a substantial change in trial conditions or procedures and that generally 
speaking, consent is in written form.43
 
  Unlike the detail provided in the investigator 
obligations, the Guidelines give neither party any guidance regarding the satisfaction of these 
obligations.  Similar to the Code and Declaration, the Guidelines are not legally binding. 
ICH Good Clinical Practice 
 
In an effort to facilitate the international harmonization and “mutual acceptance of clinical 
data by regulatory authorities” the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) was formed.  In 
1997, this organization, composed of governmental and private industry representatives, 
together with the WHO, created the “Good Clinical Practice” (ICH/GCP) standards.  While 
human rights protections were not the impetus for the creation of these standards, the 
ICH/GCP is widely accepted as industry guidance for clinical trials involving human subjects.  
Signatories to the document include representatives of governmental agencies from the 
European Union, the United States, Australia, Canada, and the Nordic countries.44
 
  
The ICH/GCP contains thirteen principles intended to ensure the safety of participants and the 
accuracy of clinical data in clinical trials. The first principle states that “clinical trials should 
be conducted in accordance with the ethical principles that have their origin in the Declaration 
of Helsinki, and that are consistent with the GCP and applicable regulatory requirements.”45  
In subsequent principles, the ICH/GCP refines the informed consent requirements contained 
in the Declaration.  Specifically, the guideline identifies protocols for obtaining consent and 
disclosing required information to prospective trial participants.46
 
    
The resulting standards separate out the roles and responsibilities of researchers (those who 
generally conduct the trials), institutional review boards (“IRBs”, which review and approve 
clinical protocols before the trial begins) and sponsors (pharmaceutical companies, research 
and academic institutions).47  In doing so, it is the first international guideline that recognizes 
sponsors as having specific obligations in clinical trials.  Similar to the CIOMS Guidelines, 
the document is specific in establishing investigator responsibilities.  For example, the 
standards identify what information the investigator must relay to the participant.48  In 
addition, the ICH/GCP describes prohibitions against coercing or unduly influencing the 
subjects and mandates that the subject is afforded “ample time and opportunity to inquire 
about the details of the trial and to decide whether or not to participate,” as well as have all 
the subject’s questions about the trial answered.49  The guidelines also require researchers to 
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Unlike the level of detail provided in other parts of the ICH/GCP, the principle addressing 
sponsor obligations is cursory at best.  The ICH/GCP limits a sponsor’s obligation to 
“implementing and maintaining quality assurance”; verifying that “subjects are protected” and 
ensuring that investigators are complying with GCP and regulatory requirements.51   The 
ICH/GCP allows the sponsor to transfer all trial-related duties to a contract research 
organization. Thus, sponsors are not required to have any direct involvement in ensuring 
quality or human rights protections.  While the standards create stringent requirements for 
informed consent, the daily responsibility for ensuring compliance remains with the 
investigator.52
 
  Accordingly, the majority of sponsor obligations are merely supervisory in 
nature.  In 1997, the FDA adopted these standards as guidance but declined to incorporate 
them into subsequent United States law.   
FDA Good Clinical Practice: One step forward, two steps . . .  
In April 2008, the FDA issued new regulations for data from clinical trials conducted outside 
the United States.53  While consistent with the ICH/GCP, they are not identical.  The FDA 
standards require that clinical trial procedures, including informed consent processes, must 
adhere to the FDA’s version of good clinical practice (GCP).  Prior to this, the FDA required 
foreign data submitted for approval to comply with ethical principles expressed in the 
Helsinki Declaration or the regulations of the country where the research was conducted – 
whichever afforded greater  protection.54  The FDA stated that one of the reasons for revising 
the guidelines is due to an “evolution of the standards for protecting human subjects”.55  In 
the preamble, the FDA notes “Although the Declaration states that it is unethical to enroll 
human subjects in poorly designed or conducted clinical trials, it does not provide guidance 
on how to ensure proper conduct of trials.”56  The FDA’s regulations echo the ICH/GCP’s 
goal of creating a “standard for conducting clinical trials in a way that . . . the rights, safety 
and well-being of trial subjects are protected.”57   Drafters designed the new requirements to 
remedy the disparities in regulatory safeguards for human research subjects in many of the 
countries where companies conduct premarketing clinical trials.  The new regulations set 
standards for foreign clinical trials that are more consistent with the requirements of 
comparable trials conducted domestically.  The most significant aspect of the GCP is that not 




For example, the regulations require sponsors to provide documents demonstrating their 
compliance with requirements of the GCP and IEC (“a review panel that is responsible for 
ensuring the protection of the rights, safety and well-being of human subjects involved in a 
clinical investigation. . .”).59  When submitting data from foreign clinical trials to the FDA, 
sponsors are obligated to describe the methods for obtaining informed consent.  Other sponsor 
obligations include: providing a description of any incentives given to the subjects; describing 
how the sponsor monitored the study to ensure that it was carried out in compliance with the 
study protocol; and identifying the IEC as well as providing documentation of the IEC’s 
decision to approve or modify the study.60 The revised regulations also identify the lone 
circumstance under which sponsors are not obligated to obtain informed consent: life-
threatening situations when the IEC has conducted a review prior to the initiation of the study 
and concluded that obtaining informed consent is not feasible.61
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Another criticism of the FDA’s GCP is its self-admitted “flexibility”.  In drafting the GCP, 
the FDA refused to incorporate the ICH/GCP’s detailed approach with respect to identifying 
responsibilities of various parties.   For instance, the ICH/GCP has specific protocols that 
must be carried out by particular parties for reporting adverse events and monitoring trials.  
Instead, the FDA adopted regulations that are sufficiently malleable to permit countries to 
take one of any number of different approaches to regulate clinical research and obtain 
informed consent.62
 
  The extent to which that “flexibility” leaves the door open for continued 
human rights abuses remains to be seen.  These issues and concerns are a reminder that while 
advances have been made in the area of informed consent, work is still needed to ensure that 
meaningful human rights protections exists for all subjects participating in clinical trials. 
 
PART II – THE EVOLVING OBLIGATION – WHERE TO NEXT? 
 
The scope of those responsible for ensuring informed consent protections has evolved since 
its international inception in 1946.   It has been argued that human subject experimentation is 
one of the few areas of health where the language of “rights” has evolved enough to have 
practical consequences.63
 
  There is a certain amount of truth in this assertion.  For the 
countries that have adopted them, the ICH/GCP and revised FDA regulations require more 
specificity and accountability in obtaining informed consent than previous guidelines.  In 
particular, the revised FDA guidelines require sponsors, rather than just researchers, to take 
active responsibility for ensuring proper informed consent procedures. These developments 
suggest the gap between the theoretical ideal and the practical reality of informed consent 
protections may be closing. Though not entirely found in one document, many of the 
components of the fully evolved set of obligations for pharmaceutical companies currently 
exist.  Drawing from those sources, Table 2 outlines what that set of obligations might look 
like.   
Table 2 – Realizing the Right to Health: Proposed Pharmaceutical Companies’ Informed 
Consent Obligations in Clinical Trials  
Elements  in Evolved Pharmaceutical Informed Consent Obligations  
Required Disclosures to FDA 
• Disclosures consistent with ICH E3 section 5.3 
o Description of when the informed consent was obtained 
o Sample of informed consent 
• Disclosures consistent with ICH E6 section 4.8 
o Identification of who obtained the informed consent 
• Description of how informed consent was obtained – requires sponsor documenting the subjects were given information 
consistent with CIOMS/WHO informed consent requirements (see below)  
• Description of actions taken to address cultural, social, religious, or literacy issues  that  may affect informed consent 
Required Disclosures to Participants currently required in 45 CFR Part 46 
• Statement that the study involves research 
• Explanation of purpose of the study 
• Explanation of procedures to be followed 
• Description of foreseeable risks or discomfort 
• Description of any benefits to subjects or  others 
• Disclosure of alternative courses of treatment 
• Confidentiality of records  
• Compensation for medical treatments in the event of injury  
• Next of kin notification in event of injury 
• Risks of injury to embryo or fetus 
• Costs to the participant 
Required Disclosures to Participants  required in 21 CFR Part 50 and ICH/GCP 
• Pertinent new information will be given 
• Approximate number of participants 
• Trial procedures 
• Trial Treatments   
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• Subject responsibilities 
• Payment for participation 
• Who will have access to the data 
• Person to contact for additional information or in the invent of injury 
• Duration of participation   
• May refuse to continue participation without risk of loss of benefits  
Required disclosures in CIOMS/WHO 
• Right to access their data  
• Benefits of research to society or community 
• Consequences of breaches in confidentiality 
• Use of genetic information 
• Sponsor name, institutional affiliation, sources of funding 
• Commercial benefits of specimen use and monetary benefits for  
• Extent of investigation responsibilities to provide medical services  
• Approval of research by ethics committee 
• Free treatment for injury 
• Compensation to family and dependents for disability or death 
• Role of  investigator as investigator and/or participant’s physician 
 
These obligations would require United States regulations to demand more specificity in what 
information is given to subjects.  On an international level, they call for the WHO and UN to 
hold pharmaceutical companies to the same level of accountability as investigators in 
acquiring informed consent.  Finally, on the industry level, they necessitate pharmaceutical 
companies’ willingness to accept responsibility for adverse incidents and compensation of 
victims without resorting to protracted litigation.  However, for any of these current or 
proposed measures to have a meaningful affect, adequate enforcement mechanisms are 
necessary. 
 
PART III THE QUESTION OF ENFORCEMENT   
 
Postscript on Trovan  
 
Informed consent literature is filled with discussions about how to enforce the human rights 
protections of trial participants, or in the alternative, how to enforce actions against non-state 
actors who violate these rights.  Many proposals struggle to address adequately the challenges 
to informed consent requirements created by multinational pharmaceutical companies 
conducting trials in countries with limited regulatory frameworks and/or inadequate human 
rights protections. For example, a frequently discussed solution is the creation of an 
international UN or WHO type tribunal that would have the authority to police international 
trials.64  Under this proposal, all countries would recognize this entity, and participation in 
resolving disputes would be mandatory.  Another suggestion has been to use the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of  International Property Rights (TRIPS) to deny intellectual 
property protections to drugs resulting from trials that violated trial participants’ rights.65  Still 
others have suggested enforcement of human rights protections for trial participants that 
requires the universal and mandatory adoption of an ethical guideline like the Nuremberg 
Code or Helsinki Declaration discussed in this article.66
 
  The flaw in these proposals is their 
reliance on the creation of an international agency or law that could challenge national 
sovereignty. 
In many developing countries, this enforcement vacuum creates insurmountable challenges 
for injured trial participants who are forced to look outside of their own country’s judicial 
system for relief against U.S.-based clinical sponsors.  In these situations, participants quickly 
learn that there is: no internationally binding law; no international forum to assess the validity 
of a human rights infringement by a non-state actor, much less sanction the violator or 
compensate the victim; and a multitude of jurisdictional obstacles that threaten their ability to 
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sue in the sponsor’s country.67
 
  The FDA’s revised clinical trial guidelines offer little in the 
way of penalties for non-compliance and even less in terms of participant redress.  For 
example, according to the GCP, if a sponsor’s conduct violates the informed consent 
regulations, the trial data is still reviewed; it just cannot be used to market or sell the drug in 
the United States.  If the sponsor’s conduct injured or caused the death of a participant, the 
regulations do not require the sponsor to administer post-trial care, compensate participants 
or, in the event of death, compensate the participant’s family. 
Even the robust set of obligations proposed in the previous section is, in isolation, inadequate 
to guarantee a pharmaceutical company’s compliance with informed consent requirements 
throughout the developing world.  However, as illustrated in the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ ruling in the Trovan case, perhaps the answer to enforcing sponsor obligations and 
ensuring human rights protections can be found not through regulations, but rather, through 
the courts.   
 
In the aftermath of Pfizer’s departure from Nigeria, the victims and family members of 
victims wanted to file suit against the company.  Among their first challenges was to find an 
appropriate forum.  International law generally does not consider corporations as “legal 
persons”.68
 
  Rather, the focus of international law is on systematic abuses of human rights and 
state interests and duties.  Accordingly, violations of international norms by a corporation are 
seldom enforceable in an international human rights forum.  Given the lack of a viable 
international forum, the plaintiffs plead their case under the United States’ Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS). 
The ATS was passed in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act and provides federal courts with 
jurisdiction over claims by foreigners for torts committed “in violation of the law of 
nations.”69  Until it fell into disuse, the statute was largely applied to protect victims of piracy 
on the high seas. More than two centuries later, advocates in the United States are testing the 
scope of the statute to protect victims of human rights abuses abroad.  In 1980, relatives of a 
Paraguayan who was kidnapped and tortured to death by a Paraguayan police official used the 
ATS to bring a claim in the United States against the officer after he moved to New York 
City.70  The Second Circuit’s adjudication of that case opened the door to more foreigners 
filing ATS suits in the United States. In 2004, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain all but closed the door on the applicability of the ATS to international claims.  In 
Sosa, the Supreme Court held that the ATS “was intended only to prohibit conduct for a 
moderate number of new international law violations that were sufficiently ‘specific, 
universal and obligatory.’”71  The Court further narrowed the applicability of the ATS by 
noting that the violation must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century 
paradigms we have recognized.” 72
 
  
In the wake of that decision, the district court evaluated the Trovan plaintiffs’ claims.  In their 
complaint, the families relied on four sources of international law that prohibited medical 
experimentation on people without their consent: the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of 
Helsinki, the CIOMS Guidelines and the ICCPR. While the district court recognized that non-
consensual medical experimentation violates the laws of nations, it held that this judicial 
determination does not entitle the plaintiffs to relief.  Relying on its interpretation of Sosa, the 
court held that the “law of nations does not create private causes of action to remedy its 
violations, but leaves to each nation the task of defining the remedies that are available for 
international law violations.”73  In turning to the claims of violations of international law 
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grounded in the Code and Declaration that supported jurisdiction under the ATS, the court 
held that the nonbinding nature of these documents “does not create a private right of action 
in U.S. federal courts” and is “unlikely to give rise to obligations in any strict sense.”74
The court concluded its reasoning by noting that: 
 
 
[A] court is not granted a roving commission to pick and choose among 
declarations of public and private international organizations that have 
articulated a view on the matter at hand.  Such declarations are almost 
invariably political statements – expressing the sensibilities and the asserted 
aspirations and demands of some countries or organizations – rather than 
statements of universally recognized legal obligations.75
 
 
As a result, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for failing to provide a predicate for 
ATS jurisdiction. 
 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case back 
to the district court.  In its opinion, the appellate court explained that the trial court 
misinterpreted the nature of customary international law and the required inquiry by Sosa.76  
According to the court, determining whether an international norm is sufficient to bring a 
cause of action under ATS requires an examination of how the norm compares with 18th 
century paradigms, whether the world community accepts the norm, and whether States 
universally abide by the norm out of a sense of mutual concern. 77
 
  
In finding the plaintiffs’ claims met that standard, the court held:  “History illustrates that 
from its origins with the trial of Nazi doctors through its evolution in international 
agreements, declarations and domestic laws, the norm prohibiting non-consensual medical 
experimentation on human subjects has become firmly embedded and has secured universal 
acceptance in the world community.”78  In correcting the trials court’s misapplication of Sosa, 
the appellate court clarified that nothing in that opinion suggests that the ATS inquiry be 
halted “ . . . if some of the sources of international law giving rise to the norm are found not to 
be binding or do not explicitly authorize the cause of action.”79  Thus, after eight years of 
litigating whether U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit affirmed the plaintiffs’ right to sue Pfizer in the United States.   On 
January 30, 2009, the appellate court remanded the case to the U.S. district court for a trial on 
the merits.  On August 10, 2009, Pfizer filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court to hear 
its appeal.80
 
 To date, the Court has not ruled. 
The Second Circuit’s Solution to the Enforcement Problem 
 
The significance of the Second Circuit’s decision is twofold.  First, it identified “informed 
consent” as a universally recognized legal norm.  Second, it permitted a lawsuit against an 
American-based pharmaceutical company for human rights violations.  In doing so, the court 
articulated a legally enforceable framework for a foreign country’s nationals to pursue clinical 
trial violations.  This case also builds on the Second Circuit’s application of the ATS to other 
human rights-related claims.  In Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., the plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants, more than 50 multinational corporations including Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb and Coca-Cola, actively collaborated with the South African government to perpetuate 
the repressive system of apartheid.81  In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ ATS claims, the court of appeals explicitly extended its jurisdictional reach over 
international human rights violations.82  These cases signify an important step in the 
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advancement of universal rules of law condemning human rights abuses. By repeatedly 
affirming foreign victims’ right to proceed with actions to redress wrongs and to hold 
companies accountable for human rights violations, whether those rights are explicitly 
codified in U.S. law or not, the Second Circuit has increased the ambit of actionable ATS 
conduct. Together, these holdings serve as persuasive authority in American courts.    
 
Within the context of informed consent, the Trovan decision is instructive in terms of the gap 
that still exists between domestic and foreign trial participant protections.  The court’s holding 
suggests that sponsor conduct that violates protections afforded to trial participants in the 
United States or countries governed by the ICH/GPS but not prohibited by the GCP could be 
actionable under the ATS.   It is this potential for U.S. pharmaceutical companies to face 
liability for human rights violations committed abroad, more so than the change in regulations 
or international standards, that may hasten informed consent measures that offer true 
protection to clinical trial participants regardless of nationality. 
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